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Biomedicine is typically defined as the branch of medicine that is based on the principles of biology and
biochemistry. A central tenet for biomedicine is the notion of disease and therapeutic specificity, i.e. the idea of
tailored treatments for discrete disorders underpinned by specific pathologies. The present paper is concerned with
how notions of disease and therapeutic specificity guide biomedical reasoning. To that end, the author proposes a
model – the specificity triad – that draws on late philosopher and physician Ludwik Fleck’s concept of “style of
thought” to offer a frame for investigating the intricate process through which links between disorders,
mechanisms, and therapeutics are established by biomedicine. Next by applying the specificity triad model to
scrutinize research efforts in two discrete areas of medicine—psychiatry and regenerative medicine—this paper
seeks to stimulate pertinent discussions in and about biomedicine. These include discussions on the ambiguous
epistemic status of psychiatry within contemporary biomedicine, as well as the relationship between developmental
biology — historically relatively disjointed from biomedical enterprise — and the burgeoning field of regenerative
medicine.
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Biomedicine is typically defined as the branch of medi-
cine based on the principles of biology and biochemistry.
Although the word biomedicine did not gain real cur-
rency until the second half of the twentieth century,
historians have tracked the roots of biomedicine to
the nineteenth century when biology and biochemistry
became important resources in clinical medicine [1].
Several commentators from both inside and outside
medicine have noted how the ascendance of biomedicine
brought with it an increased emphasis on disease and
therapeutic specificity, i.e. the idea of tailored treatments
for discrete disorders underpinned by specific patholo-
gies [2-4]. Thus a chief goal of biomedicine has been
to develop “magic bullet” therapies, a termed coined
at the turn of the twentieth century by Paul Ehrlich,
the discoverer of tetanus antitoxin and arsenic treatment
of syphilis, to describe drugs that would attack theCorrespondence: shai.mulinari@soc.lu.se
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unless otherwise stated.pathogenic invader without damaging its human host
[5]. However, to date, there have been few attempts to
connect this observation to theories from the philosophy
of science on the nature of scientific reasoning.
Against this background, the primary aim of this paper
is to outline an analytic frame that draws on Ludwik
Fleck’s philosophy of science [6] and that may help ad-
dress how, more precisely, a commitment to disease and
therapeutic specificity structures biomedical reasoning.
In particular, the aim is to offer a frame for investigating
the intricate process through which links between disor-
ders, mechanisms, and therapeutics are being worked
out in biomedicine. A secondary aim is to employ this
frame to disentangle some ongoing discussions in and
about biomedicine. These include pertinent debates about
the ambiguous epistemic status of psychiatry within con-
temporary biomedicine, as well as the relationship be-
tween developmental biology — historically relatively
disjointed from biomedical enterprise— and the burgeon-
ing field of regenerative medicine.
The outline of the paper is as follows. I begin by briefly
placing notions of disease and therapeutic specificity intoThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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propose a model — the specificity triad — that draws on
Fleck’s concept of “style of thought” and that may allow
for a more systematic examination of how such notions
guide biomedical reasoning. In the paper’s final section,
the specificity triad is used to scrutinize two distinct areas
of medicine that have received much scholarly attention in
recent years: regenerative medicine and psychiatry. More
precisely, I discuss (1) how developmental biology is con-
tributing to the field of regenerative medicine by focusing
on the pathophysiology underpinning particular disorders
and finding magic bullet cellular cures, and (2) how the
well-recognized ambiguous epistemic status of psychiatry
in contemporary medicine relates to its longstanding in-
ability to do precisely that: to tailor treatments for discrete
disorders underpinned by specific pathologies.
The rise of disease and therapeutic specificity and the
advent of biomedicine
Medical historians tell us that the idea of disease and thera-
peutic specificity is a relatively new arrival in the history of
medicine [7]. It is an idea that began to permeate the core
of medical reasoning at the turn of the twentieth century,
parallel to the unfolding of the sciences of bacteriology and
immunology, but it soon became an organizing principle of
medical thinking, epitomized, as we have seen, in Ehrlich’s
call for “magic bullet” therapeutics. From the vantage point
of today, such notions may seem obvious, but for doctors
working just a few centuries back this was definitely not
the case. In fact, during larger parts of the nineteenth cen-
tury, doctors were confined to using general treatments,
such as bleeding, in combination with an array of drugs,
herbs, and poisons whose effects were judged on the basis
of their ability to induce visible bodily reactions such
as diarrhea, vomiting, perspiration, and urination. The
therapeutic value of such treatments was understood and
rationalized in the intellectual framework of early-to-mid
nineteenth century Western medicine, a framework shared
by doctors and patients alike [8]. The underlying rationale
was that by provoking potent somatic manifestations the
body would regain its normal equilibrium and the patient
would be relieved of disease. A classic example is mercury,
a popular early nineteenth-century remedy. At low doses it
produces obvious bodily reactions such as diarrhea; at high
doses or after prolonged treatment, serious mercury intoxi-
cation follows, which is associated with copious and uncon-
trolled production of saliva. Instructively, it was precisely
this capacity of mercury to elicit, in a concentration-
dependent manner, manifest somatic reactions that by early
nineteenth century medicine were hailed as proof of its
curative effect involving a mechanism that restored bodily
imbalances to a state of healthy equilibrium [8].
But a few decades later, by the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the framework of Western medicine wasundergoing radical changes as bacteriology and clinical
medicine were able to link more and more disorders to
specific pathogens. Two inaugural discoveries of the “era
of specificity” in medicine, attributed to Robert Koch,
were the identification of Bacillus anthracis (1876) and
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (1882) as the etiological
agents of anthrax and tuberculosis, respectively. Koch
famously went on to define a set of methodological rules
(known as Koch’s four postulates) for the detection of
specific etiological agents of various infectious diseases,
which arguably helped to establish specificity as an epi-
stemic space in bacteriology and clinical medicine in the
sense that, henceforth, the idea that every infectious dis-
ease is a well-defined entity caused by a specific micro-
organism gained wide acceptance in specialist circles [9].
Around this time, researchers also began to recognize
that specific microbial agents elicited not only distinct
diseases, but also distinct protective host responses [10].
This insight paved the way for the newly emerging
discipline of immunology, which revolved around the
investigation of antibodies produced by animals in re-
sponse to microbial infection [11]. Historians have docu-
mented how the establishment of immunology as an
independent medical discipline in the late nineteenth
century was tightly bound to the idea of how specificity
could be applied to objects distinct from — albeit closely
linked with — those of bacteriology (microorganisms)
and clinical medicine (diseases). Keating and Cambrosio
[12] write:
“For immunology to be constituted as an autonomous
disciplinary form, it had to be distinguished from both
bacteriology and clinical medicine without the
foundations or the purpose of either. To remain
within a network spanning bacteriology and clinical
medicine, it was necessary to speak of species (both
species of disease and species of organisms), and it
was necessary to speak of specific antibodies to specific
microorganisms that gave rise to specific diseases.”
(p. 320; emphasis added)
Importantly, toward the turn of the twentieth century,
specificity in diagnosis and etiology/host response was
supplemented with specificity in therapeutics, following
the introduction of some disease-specific pharmaceuti-
cals and preventive medical technologies. The most rad-
ical therapeutic innovations of this period comprise
various vaccines, such as the anthrax and smallpox vac-
cines introduced in 1883, the rabies vaccine introduced
in 1885, and the diphtheria antitoxin introduced in 1890
[13]. Notably, it was by explicit analogy to the antitoxins
that Ehrlich, in the first decade of the new century, ar-
rived at his powerful concept of magic bullet drugs: that
is, chemically manufactured pharmaceuticals that would
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[5]. According to Ehrlich, the prospects for radical devel-
opments in pharmacology lay wide open: the mission of
pharmacologists was “to learn to aim, aim in a chemical
way,” an idea that has provided momentum to the field
ever since.
Following this short overview, it seems fair to con-
clude that by the early twentieth century bacteriology,
immunology, and pharmacology could emerge as (what
we today term as) biomedical disciplines by applying no-
tions of specificity to distinct yet connected domains of
biological and biochemical inquiry relevant to medicine
[12]. But of more relevance to the present argument is –
as historian Charles Rosenberg has shown [14] – how
the emerging biomedical sciences collectively carried the
promise of supplying medicine with a new framework
rooted in notions of disease and therapeutic specificity
through which to delineate and target the intricate som-
atic mechanisms of disease.
Approaching notions of specificity in biomedicine
So how may one analytically approach notions of specifi-
city that appear to play such a pivotal role in the history of
biomedical thought? One possibility would be to describe
biomedicine’s commitment to specificity as an ethos, i.e. as
a spirit that guides research in this field. In this way, the
“ethos of specificity” would dominate the disciplinary
search for discrete particulars (a search of courses not
unique to biomedicine). A not altogether dissimilar choice,
informed by the work of historians Lorraine Daston and
Peter Galison [15], would be to consider specificity an epi-
stemic virtue for biomedicine. Daston and Galison use the
term epistemic virtue to refer to ideas of what is consid-
ered good research in an intellectual and moral sense.
Hence the “epistemic virtue of specificity” would denote
the value that the collective of biomedical researchers
ascribe to specificity (essentially that specificity is a good
thing, whereas non-specificity is generally bad).
However, while these approaches may provide valuable
insights, describing biomedicine’s commitment to speci-
ficity as either an ethos or an epistemic virtue would by
itself appear unsatisfactory if one, as is the case here,
were interested in delineating in greater detail how a
commitment to specificity guides biomedical reasoning.
Moreover, these approaches fall short in providing an
analytic frame for investigating the intricate process
through which links between specific disorders, mecha-
nisms, and therapeutics are being worked out in biomedi-
cine. That is, if one restricts oneself to an investigation of
the “ethos” or “epistemic virtue” of specificity, one argu-
ably runs the risk of missing the central point, which is
that not only do discrete entities matter in biomedicine,
but also—and perhaps more so—the multiple lines that
can be drawn between them.Another and related option would be to think of speci-
ficity in terms of a “regulative principle”; i.e., a common
denominator that allows coordination of research efforts
across a wide array of bio-disciplines [11]. As we have
seen, some historical evidence supports this view, espe-
cially in relation to the emergence of immunology as a
distinct discipline. In this case, identification of specific
host responses contributed to the emergence of immun-
ology as a separate discipline, connected to other biomed-
ical disciplines that share a profound dedication to
specificity. But while this approach may provide precious
insights regarding academic specialization, it is less useful
for investigating how notions of specificity structure the
style of thought shared by biomedical disciplines – a mat-
ter to which the remainder of this paper is dedicated.
Notions of disease and therapeutic specificity in the style
of thought of biomedicine
The concept of style of thought is credited to Ludwik Fleck
(1896–1961), a Polish-born physiciana, bacteriologist, im-
munologist, and often-regarded pioneer philosopher of
science [6]. For Fleck, a style of thought (Denkstil) repre-
sented the system of beliefs, judgments, methods, emo-
tions, values, and feelings, as well as common problems of
interest to a certain community of persons mutually ex-
changing ideas, or, as he would have it, of a particular
thought collective (Denkkolektiv). In short, it was “the en-
tirety of intellectual preparedness for one particular way of
seeing or acting, but not for another [6] (p. 64).” Thus the
style of thought is what makes certain ideas thinkable and
renders others unthinkable for a certain collective of per-
sons, such as a community of scientists.
A central element in Fleck’s philosophy is that every
individual belongs to several thought collectives at once:
scientists are not only members of a scientific thought
collective; they may participate in political, religious,
national, and cultural thought collectives too. Signifi-
cantly, it is from the multiple interactions within and be-
tween thought collectives that the complex matrix of
our societies emerges. Moreover, Fleck explains, within
any given thought collective it is possible to distinguish
between an inner esoteric circle of experts and an outer
exoteric circle of non-specialists who gravitate around
a certain style of thought. In the case of biomedicine,
the inner esoteric circle may be construed as encom-
passing all scientists and related experts who actively
share the style of thought of this science. Typically, such
specialists engage in research; they publish and read arti-
cles in specialized journals; they attend meetings and
conferences; they share methods and reagents; they
organize themselves into professional organizations, etc.
But we then have the exoteric circle of laymen for which
Fleck sets no clear criteria for inclusion, except that
members need to gravitate around the thought style and,
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of experts.
Strikingly, the contention advanced here, that notions
of disease and therapeutic specificity constitute an or-
ganizing principle in the style of thought of biomedicine,
may actually not be far from Fleck’s own views on the
subject, as they are expressed in his once-neglected
monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wis-
senschaftlichen Tatsache. This work was first published
in German in 1935, but was not translated into English
until 1979, following its rediscovery by historians and
philosophers of science [6]. The historical case study
expounded by Fleck in this monograph revolves around
the “serological thought collective” which, Fleck explains,
developed the Wassermann reaction, an antibody-based
test, into a practical diagnostic test for the detection of
syphilis at the beginning of the twentieth century. In his
historical investigation of how this test became reified,
Fleck uncovers a collection of style elements that he finds
to be characteristic of this alleged “serological thought
collective,” and that form the conceptual basis for the
Wasserman reaction. Among the style elements singled
out by Fleck, we encounter: (1) that the reaction between
antigen and antibody is specific; (2) the existence of
specific disease entities that can be identified by means
of systematic clinical and laboratory observation; (3)
that every infectious disease is caused by a specific
infectious organism; and (4) that host and microorgan-
isms are in conflict. In stark contrast to the views of the
“serological thought community” depicted by Fleck, he
himself advanced the minority position that infectious
diseases should be considered the outcome of dynamic
interactions between host and microbe, rather than as
specific entities caused by specific bacterial species.
Now, in a reevaluation of Fleck’s work, van den Belt
and Gremmen [11] reached the conclusion that the array
of style elements identified by Fleck can in principle be
reduced to one common denominator: specificity. In
agreement with my own reading, the authors suggest
that “Fleck’s serological thought style is best seen as part
of a more general thought style” (p.464) that gravitates
around the notion of specificity and which, they argue,
was shared by clinical medicine, serology, and bacteri-
ology alike. “Specificity in this broad sense,” they con-
clude, “might be an exemplary expression of what Fleck
called a ‘stylistic bond’ existing ‘between many, if not all,
concepts of a period’.” (p.468)
In the literature, Fleck is often mentioned as the first
writer who made a compelling case for the sociology of
scientific knowledge [16]. In this sense, his ideas are
most often compared to those of Kuhn, who launched
his paradigm theory almost 30 years later [17] — and in-
deed Kuhn was influenced by Fleck, which formed the
basis for the rediscovery of Fleck in the mid-1960s. Butwhile Fleck and Kuhn definitely share many commonal-
ities, especially concerning the role that both authors
ascribe to the social conditioning of thought for scien-
tific fact-making, there are also some significant differ-
ences. Perhaps most importantly, when Kuhn discusses
meaning-shifts in science, he does this in relation to sci-
entific revolutions that bring about paradigm shifts; that
is, a gestalt change in which a new interpretation of the
body of existing facts completely replaces an existing
one, with which it is incommensurable. Fleck, by con-
trast, envisions styles as much more flexible entities: as
networks of concepts and facts that may evolve signifi-
cantly over time [18]. Thus, whereas Kuhnian paradigms
are incapable of accommodating anomalies ad infinitum,
Fleckian styles might in principle evolve beyond recogni-
tion when repeatedly challenged.
Fleck’s distinction between active and passive linkages
within a style of thought may be of some help to under-
stand how Fleck envisions styles might evolve over time.
Active linkages are the background elements — an ideo-
logical prism perhaps — that structure the cognitive acts
of individuals of a thought collective. Passive linkages ori-
ginate when individuals observe the outside world through
the ideological prism instilled in them by the thought col-
lective. Fleck also notes how some facts (passive linkages),
once they have become certain and reproducible, can ma-
ture into active linkages as the thought style evolves. The
history of biology and medicine provides numerous exam-
ples of this. Think only of how various scientific facts
that at an earlier stage seemed uncertain — the nature
and structure of DNA, neurochemical transmission in the
nervous system, the reprogramming of somatic cells into
stem cells — now have come to enable and structure
scientific reasoning in entire areas of science.
The main point here is that styles can evolve by turn-
ing passive linkages into active ones in a dialectic
process involving, on the one side, ideological elements
intrinsic to the thought style and, on the other side, the
outside material world extrinsic to it. This interpretation
of Fleck’s work incorporates both “materialistic” and
“idealistic” aspects of his thinking that some commenta-
tors have found discordant [18], since it assumes that
the bulk of scientific knowledge of a given thought
collective is shaped both by constraints imposed by a
mind-independent world and by the mind-dependent
collective thought styleb.
The specificity triad: modeling biomedical reasoning
Following van den Belt and Gremmen’s reading of Fleck
[11], the idea of specificity may be viewed as a stylistic
bond that exists between facts and concepts employed
by a biomedical thought collective. But what is the na-
ture of such stylistic bonds, and how can they guide bio-
medical reasoning?
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in an attempt to approach these questions. In brief, the
specificity triad refers to a framework in the style of
thought of biomedicine created by stylistic bonds, or
links, between therapeutics, disorders and pathological
mechanisms that, I shall argue, underpin biomedical rea-
soning (Figure 1). Importantly, while the framework is
made up of such links, it is the framework that enables
the linking process in the first place. In other words, the
framework allows for the establishment of novel links
between therapeutics, disorders, and pathological mech-
anisms. The resultant linkages can then be assimilated
into the triad, typically resulting in a further fortification
of the framework. Using Fleck’s terminology, the specifi-
city triad can thus be said to model a set of active link-
ages in the thought style of biomedicine. These active
linkages structure thinking, perception, and reasoning by
providing a framework for interpreting and manipulating
the outside world as it presents itself in the form of
drugs, patients, experimental results, etc. (passive link-
ages), which can then in turn, over time, reify into active
linkages, thereby allowing the thought style to evolve.
But what is the nature of these links? What are they
made of? I suggest that one may readily differentiate be-
tween three types of links: material, theoretical, and semi-
otic. By material links, I refer to connections made from
material entities. These would include such things as
drugs, molecules, germs, experimental equipment, and
diagnostic tests that all act to join disorder, pathological
mechanism, and therapeutics together in the knowledge
system of biomedicine. For example, after Alexander
Fleming made his now legendary observation in 1928 that
the Penicillium mold obliterates the staphylococcus bac-
terium responsible for a great many infectious deaths, a
firm connection was established between a specific ther-
apy, a discrete disorder, and an underlying pathological
mechanism. Similarly, the discovery of insulin, its subse-
quent synthesis and its employment as a treatment for
diabetes contributed to the creation of a framework within
which specific connections between therapeutics, disorder,
and pathologic mechanism could be further elaborated inFigure 1 The specificity triad: a model of a framework in the
style of thought of biomedicine. Disorders, therapeutics, and
pathological mechanisms are joined together by links that can be
material, theoretical, and semiotic in nature. See text for details.endocrinology and later in regenerative medicine (see
below). It is easy to see how such material connections
contribute to the reinforcement and evolution of a frame-
work that allows researchers to further pursue issues re-
lated to, in these cases, infectious diseases and diabetes.
However, it would also seem clear that the fabrication of
material links in the first place follows a script revolving
around notions of specificity.
By theoretical links I refer to connections made via ex-
plicit mechanistic models, including various disease and
treatment models. Such models usually act to connect
therapy, somatic mechanism and disorder on a concep-
tual level. Mechanistic models are often based on prior
established material links. For example, in the case of
depression, researchers have used the biochemical and
therapeutic effects of antidepressant drugs to devise vari-
ous pathophysiological theories about the disorder [19].
But theoretical links can also generate material links;
for example when pathophysiological theories provide
impetus to drug development. Significantly, theoretical
links contribute to reinforcement and evolution of the
framework which enables scientists to collectively en-
gage in research.
Semiotic, finally, refers to connections through lan-
guage. For instance, the very act of calling a drug an
anti-depressant automatically connects depressive dis-
order to this particular type of therapeutics [20]. Simi-
larly, commonplace gene-talk about “genes for” certain
disorders, such as dyslexia or diabetes connects, by
means of rhetoric, pathological mechanism to disorder
[21]. Or, to take another example from psychiatry, talk
about “chemical imbalances” in relation to mood disor-
ders connects pathological mechanism and disorder
without much need for an explicit scientific theory [22]
(see below). As with material and theoretical links, I sug-
gest that semiotic links are contingent on the existence
of an a priori framework that makes their fabrication
possible and acceptable.
A possible counterargument is that some—perhaps
even all—links may at once be construed as material,
theoretical, and semiotic in nature. For instance, one
could ask if not all material links are theory-laden and
language-dependent? Should this indeed be the case, it
would perhaps be better to speak of material-theoretical-
semiotic links, or mechanistic links or simply links, ra-
ther than separating them into seemingly neat classes.
However, as philosopher Ian Hacking [23] has argued,
the common truism that all observations in science are
theory-laden needs to be better specified. While it is
probably true that our ability to interpret and describe
the world depends on the state of our knowledge — that
what we “see” is contingent upon what we “know” —
our state of knowledge should not be confused with our
explicit theories about the world. Thus we may learn to
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modate those observations. Similarly, to claim that ma-
terial links are language-dependent is not the same as
saying that material links are determined by language, or
that they can be reduced to language [21]. Consequently,
condensing material, theoretical and semiotic links into
a single category may not be particularly useful, but
instead contribute to concealing important distinctions
between, say, the effect of drugs on molecules or symp-
toms (material), the way those effects are explicitly in-
corporated into mechanistic models (theoretical), and
the metaphors and rhetoric sometimes used when speak-
ing about those effects (semiotic).
Regenerating development: the specificity triad in
regenerative medicine
Arguably, a main virtue of the specificity triad model is
how it focuses the analytic gaze on the various material,
theoretical, and semiotic links forged between therapeu-
tics, disorder, and pathophysiology. In the following
sections of this paper the specificity triad is used to
scrutinize two distinct areas of medicine: regenerative
medicine and psychiatry. In this first part I discuss how
such links are currently worked out at the intersection
of developmental biology and the burgeoning field of re-
generative medicine, which is concerned with replacing
or regenerating human cells, tissues, or organs, to re-
store or establish normal function. The point is to show
how this intermingling is transforming developmental
biology into a core biomedical discipline. Paraphrasing
Ehrlich, the prospect of developmental biology appears,
in this view, to lay wide open: the mission is to learn to
aim, aim in a cellular way, an idea that is now providing
strong momentum to the field.
Much has been written about the history of develop-
mental biology, or embryology as the field was known
until the 1950’s, and its complex relation to other fields
(e.g. [24,25]). Against this background it seems fair to
conclude that over the preceding century the bulk of
work in developmental biology has had little relation to
biomedical concerns: the general focus was not on find-
ing cures for specific human disorders or delineating
specific pathologic mechanisms, but rather on uncover-
ing general principles of organism development that
could explain the reproducibility of development within
species. That said, there have undoubtedly been import-
ant areas of overlap between developmental biology and
biomedical efforts, for example in research on teratology
[26]. Significantly, this area of overlap has increased
over the last decades following the realignment of genet-
ics and developmental biology [27], epitomized in the
1995 and 2002 Nobel Prizes awarded to developmental
biologists for research on genetic control of embryonic
development [28,29]. Crucially, as argued below, thisintermingling has since deepened further, to the extent
that leading developmental biologists are now calling on
their peers to truly contribute to explaining disease and
treating it by finding magic bullet cellular cures for spe-
cific disorders.
Thus in the opening pages of the first 2013 issue of
the journal Development – launched in 1953 as the Jour-
nal of Embryology and Experimental Morphology, and
ever since a leading journal in the field of developmental
biology – Editor-in-Chief Oliver Pourquié stressed the
great opportunities that lay ahead for developmental bi-
ologists to contribute to medical treatments and the un-
derstanding of human pathologies [30]. He appropriately
called his piece Regenerating development, which alluded
both to the journal Development’s alleged need to re-
embrace the growing field of stem cell biology – which
he described as an offshoot of developmental biology –
and to the prospect for developmental biology as a dis-
cipline to make significant contributions to the field of
regenerative medicine. He did this against the backdrop
of developmental biologist John Gurdon and stem cell
biologist Shinya Yamanaka having shared the 2012 Nobel
Prize for their work on stem cells and reprogramming.
This work spanned more the four decades. In 1962, inci-
dentally the same year Yamanaka was born, Gurdon re-
ported in the pages of the Journal of Embryology and
Experimental Morphology that he could reprogram the
nucleus of an adult frog cell to a totipotent embryonic
state by nuclear transplantation [31]. This set the stage
for subsequent research on reprogramming of cells, in-
cluding from Yamanaka’s group, which in 2006 suc-
ceeded in identifying a small number of genes within the
genome of mice that seemed decisive in this process
[32]. As noted by Pourquié, this line of work revolution-
ized the field of developmental biology conceptually be-
cause it “shows that it is possible to reverse the course of
development and differentiation” (p.1). However, it also
revolutionized the field in the sense of aligning it with
biomedical efforts: combined with recent developments
in organ culture from stem cells in vitro, reprograming
of cells “means that recreating human organs in vitro is
a real and achievable goal” (p.1). Pourquié writes:
“This should open a new era in which the uncharted
territory of human developmental biology will be
explored. In addition, it will allow us to produce
differentiated cells of all human lineages at all stages
of differentiation, raising the possibility of establishing
in vitro models of human diseases to study their
pathophysiology and to screen for new treatments or
cures. Finally, these advances should favour the
development of cell therapy and regenerative medicine,
potentially allowing the replacement of missing cells of
body parts with cells from organs engineered in vitro.
Mulinari Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2014, 9:14 Page 7 of 11
http://www.peh-med.com/content/9/1/14These are some of the major challenges that are now
within reach thanks to Gurdon and Yamanaka’s
discoveries” (p.1).
In sum, in this view, the prospect of developmental
biology as a biomedical enterprise lies in (1) providing
models of human pathologies and in testing and devel-
oping new therapies for these disorders, and (2) re-
placing missing cells of body parts with cultured cells.
Crucially for my argument, the underlying idea is that
recent breakthroughs have created a niche for develop-
mental biologists where they can fortify links between
disorder, pathophysiology, and therapeutics for a wide
range of human diseases and hence contribute to the
overarching biomedical enterprise.
Indeed, such efforts are already underway. A recent re-
view published in the prestigious journal Cell Metabol-
ism summarizes these efforts as follows in regard to
research on various subgroups of diabetes [33]:
“The landmark discovery of induced pluripotent stem
cells (iPSCs) by Shinya Yamanaka has transformed
regenerative biology. Previously, insights into the
pathogenesis of chronic human diseases have been
hindered by the inaccessibility of patient samples.
However, scientists are now able to convert patient
fibroblasts into iPSCs and differentiate them into
disease-relevant cell types. This ability opens new
avenues for investigating disease pathogenesis and
designing novel treatments. In this review, we highlight
the uses of human iPSCs to uncover the underlying
causes and pathological consequences of diabetes
and metabolic syndromes, multifactorial diseases
whose etiologies have been difficult to unravel using
traditional methodologies” (p.775).
The idea, then, is that scientists have begun to use
stem cells – in this case induced pluripotent stem cells
(iPSC) – to establish firm connections between various
disorders, pathologies and treatments. The text goes
on to specify the numerous material links that are being
established, in particular by reprogramming somatic
cells from patients with various forms of diabetes into
so-called diabetes-induced pluripotent stem cells (DiPSCs)
which can then be used to identify “new genes and path-
ways that contribute to diabetes pathogenesis in humans
and novel drugs that target these pathways” (p.780). How-
ever, this work can also be seen as elaborating theoretical
links between the triad’s nodes. Thus, conceptually, the
text advances the notion of DiPSCs as a novel and more
attractive disease model in which to screen for therapeu-
tics compared with conventional rodent models, which
are chided for not replicating the complexity of human
pathogenesis. Moreover, echoing Pourquié, the reviewcrafts semiotic links by means of the rhetorical act of mak-
ing future-orientated claims about regenerative medicine,
stating for example that DiPSCs “may one day provide a
source of patient-specific replacement cells for β-cells lost
to diabetes…” (p.778). This latter point is vital because
such hopes are currently informing a major collective bio-
medical research effort concerned with how these cells
can be mobilized to permanently regenerate damaged tis-
sue without injuring the human recipient. In conclusion,
we can see how the intermingling of developmental biol-
ogy and medicine is contingent on a framework of specifi-
city, but also how developmental biology carries the
promise of invigorating biomedicine by establishing fresh
links between disorders, therapeutics, and pathologies.
The next section explores what may happen in case such
promises remain unfulfilled.
When things fall apart: the specificity triad in psychiatry
Psychiatry is the branch of medicine concerned with the
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of mental and emo-
tional disorders. Compared with other medical special-
ties, psychiatry was relatively late in absorbing notions of
disease and therapeutic specificity into clinical practice
and research. Historians and psychiatrists have noted
how this strongly contributed to the ambiguous epi-
stemic status of this medical specialty in the first half of
the twentieth century [4,34]. Yet social scientists have
argued that the same can be said about the epistemic
status of psychiatry in contemporary medicine [35,36].
The present analysis will discuss how this ambiguity re-
lates to psychiatry’s long-standing struggle to establish
firm connections between specific disorders, therapeu-
tics, and pathologies.
Historians tell us that the first psychiatric treatment
to be generally recognized as specific for a distinct
psychiatric disorder was introduced as early as 1917 by
Viennese psychiatrist Julius Wagner-Jauregg [34]. In the
course of his experimenting with psychiatric patients,
Wagner-Jauregg discovered that the fever induced by
malaria might cure people suffering from General Paralysis
of the Insane, or Dementia Paralytica, a lethal psychiatric
disorder caused by syphilis infection in the brain, which,
as it turned out, could be attenuated by elevating body
temperature, a discovery that gained Wagner-Jauregg the
Nobel Prize ten years later in 1927. The importance of
the discovery of “fever cure” for psychiatry should not
be underestimated. For the first time, psychiatrists had
proof of principle that psychiatric disorders and treat-
ments were not necessarily dissimilar from those of
other medical specialties. As in the rest of medicine,
it therefore also seemed reasonable for psychiatry to
engage in a search for specific treatments for specific
disorders with specific causes [34]. This motivation was
strengthened a few decades later when insulin coma,
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into psychiatric practice [4]. By 1940, it had become
widely assumed in specialist circles that hour-long insulin
comas provoked by injections of the hormone insulin con-
stituted a specific and efficient treatment for schizophre-
nia. Simultaneously, shock treatments, first chemically and
then electrically induced (so-called ECT), were considered
by many experts to be specific and effective for severe
depressions. A few years later, near the end of World War
II, penicillin supplanted fever cure as specific treatment for
neurosyphilis. “By the mid-twentieth century,” concludes
psychiatrist Joanna Moncrieff in her historical overview
of biological treatments in psychiatry during this period,
“psychiatrists finally believed that they could resolve the
problems experienced by people under their care by
acting on what they presumed was the bodily basis of
the problem” [4] (p.40).
Importantly, for the purpose of this paper, the belief
that psychiatric treatments acted on the somatic basis of
disorder provided strong impetus for biological research
in psychiatry. Moreover, this belief was reinforced after
the serendipitous discovery of so-called antidepressant
and antipsychotic medications in the 1950s [37]. To cite
one important example, such ideas underpinned the
1969 decision by the US National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) to set up a large program on the “psy-
chobiology of depression” [19]. This program eventually
enrolled about 1400 patients with the aim of solving
a set of pertinent medical questions related to depres-
sion and antidepressants [38]. In the preceding years
NIMH staff had become increasingly impressed by the
“burgeoning productivity of biochemists, biological psy-
chiatrists, and psychophysiologists in this field, and the
potential these results might have on its [depression’s]
understanding and treatment” [39] (p.x). The NIMH
therefore decided to sponsor a research effort that would
concentrate on three major objectives: “(1) nosology —
the development of a sound, reliable system of classifica-
tion of the depressive disorders; (2) genetics — the design
of studies to permit the definitive test of hypotheses
concerning the role of genetics; and (3) pathophysiology —
the investigation of the role of specific biochemical,
neurophysiological, and endocrine mechanisms impli-
cated in the etiology of depression” [40] (p.766). Regard-
ing the objective to investigate pathophysiology, it was
felt that “without such [pathophysiological] hypotheses to
guide research, new, more effective treatment methods
and deeper understanding of the affective disorders prob-
ably would not be realized” [40] (p.767). In sum, the
explicit aim was to explore empirically and conceptually
the biologic basis of affective disorders; i.e., to establish
material and conceptual links between disorder and
pathophysiology, including genetics, as this could offer a
firm basis for developing efficient treatment methods.But despite this extensive research undertaking that
lasted for over a decade, the program proved disappoint-
ing since researchers failed to find the biological basis of
affective disorders [19]. Nonetheless, the undertaking left
a long-lasting impression on the field as it helped trans-
form psychiatric nosology [41]. A major issue had been
to find a set of operational criteria for psychiatric diag-
nosis that would permit researchers to reliably assign pa-
tients to specific disorder categories (e.g. depression,
mania, schizophrenia). It was believed that a reliable
diagnostic system needed to be in place before biomed-
ical research in psychiatry could progress significantly.
To this end, seminal psychiatrists (e.g. Eli Robins, Robert
Spitzer and Jean Endicott) went on to develop the
so-called Research Diagnostic Criteria, a collection of
operational criteria for psychiatric diagnosis used by
the researchers in the program [42,43]. Crucially, the
Research Diagnostic Criteria and the intra-institutional
and individual ties established during its development,
notably between Robert Spitzer in New York, Eli Robins
and Sam Guze in St. Louis, and Gerald Klerman in
Boston, laid the foundation for the work that culminated
in the DSM III, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, which was published 5 years later, in
1980 [44-46]. As noted by commentators from a wide
spectrum of academic positions, including biological
psychiatry, publication of the DSM III brought with it a
reconfiguration of world psychiatry into a “justifiable”
medical specialty that, like the rest of medicine, could
be represented as treating legitimate disorders, which,
according to the norms of biomedicine, should have
discrete boundaries and be linked to specific underlying
causes [45,47,48]. Nancy Andreasen, prominent biomed-
ical psychiatrist with close ties to the DSM III task force
responsible for drafting the manual, made this view expli-
cit when she, a few years after the launch of the DSM III,
outlined the creed of specificity as applied to psychiatry by
crafting theoretical and semiotic links between psychiatric
disorders, therapies, and pathologies:
“The major psychiatric illnesses are diseases…caused
principally by biological factors, and most of those
factors reside in the brain…As a scientific discipline,
psychiatry seeks to identify the biological factors
that cause mental illness…This model assumes that
each different type of illness has a different specific
cause…Because these diseases are considered to be
of biological origin, the therapy is seen as correcting
an underlying biological imbalance” [49] (p.29-30;
italics in original).
By the early 1980s, leading professionals and researchers
had thus collectively rejected notions of non-specificity,
replacing them with a seemingly unanimous discourse on
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succinctly formulated than in the above quote from
Andreasen. However, despite assurances from leading psy-
chiatrists, researchers continued to experience difficulties
in establishing firm material connections between disor-
ders, therapies, and pathologic mechanisms. This was, for
example, made explicit in a 2002 consensus statement by
a workgroup charged by the NIMH with analyzing major
gaps in the knowledge of mood disorders and their treat-
ments, and with formulating a series of recommendations
for the NIMH to help overcome obstacles [50]. The work-
group described the limited progress in the field since the
serendipitous discovery of effective psychotropic medica-
tions in the 1950s as follows (p.503):
“We still do not understand with certainty how those
medications produce their desired clinical effects. We
have not introduced newer medications with
fundamentally different mechanisms of action than
the older agents. We have not identified the genetic
and neurobiological mechanisms underlying
depression and mania, nor do we understand the
mechanisms by which nongenetic factors influence
these disorders. We have only a rudimentary
understanding of the circuits in the brain responsible
for the normal regulation of mood and affect, and of
those circuits that function abnormally in mood
disorders.”
The situation ten years later appears almost equally
disappointing, although there has been some recent pro-
gress, especially regarding the putative role of various
brain circuits in some psychiatric states [51]. Thus
biomarkers are still lacking for the main psychiatric
diagnoses [52], and most major drug companies have
dropped psychotropic research, partly due to the lack of
viable biological hypotheses [53]. From the perspective
of neuroscience, a main obstacle to progress is claimed
to be the absence of an objective diagnostic and classifi-
cation system in psychiatry. It is argued that, unlike the
rest of medicine that typically identifies and categorizes
diseases on the basis of physiological and histological ab-
normalities, psychiatry identifies its disorders with sub-
jective behavioral tests that have not been rigorously
validated. This results in heterogeneous patient cohorts
with which it is notoriously difficult to work. Neurosci-
entist Husseini Manji has argued: “The heterogeneity
implicit in the current classification schemes is a prob-
able reason for the limited success of clinical studies, at
the levels of treatment, neurobiology and genetics” [54]
(p.189). Similarly, other prominent researchers have
pointed out how the current, non-biological diagnostic
system “poses obvious obstacles to the interpretation of
genome-wide association studies, as well as neuroimagingand post mortem investigation” [55] (p.894) The perhaps
most broadcasted statement of this sort came from
Thomas Insel [56], NIMH director, who prior to the
imminent launch of the DSM V wrote on his NIMH
blog that the manual is “at best, a dictionary, creating a
set of labels and defining each“ and that ”its weakness is
its lack of validity.” He said that the NIMH would reori-
ent its research away from the manual because “unlike
our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or
AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus
about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective
laboratory measure.”
Anthropologist Andrew Lakoff has argued that the
failure of neuroscience research to provide biological
validation for psychiatry’s diagnostic categories poses
not only a challenge to the legitimacy of psychiatric
knowledge, but questions the very existence of its ob-
jects [35]. He quotes a leading psychiatric expert who
expressed “frustration at the epistemological status of
psychiatry” and who complained that: “(…) In no other
branch of medicine have investigators (and practitioners)
been called on to demonstrate time and time again that
the diseases they study really are diseases.” Ostensibly,
such statements expose the ambiguous epistemic status
of psychiatry in contemporary medicine. This ambiguity,
I contend, is testimony to the incongruity between, on
the one hand, the style of thought of biomedicine that
underpins biological research in psychiatry and, on the
other hand, the long-standing nebulous nature of the
links between specific disorders, pathologies, and thera-
peutics in psychiatry.
Conclusion
This article has developed a frame that may allow for a
fruitful analysis of how notions of disease and thera-
peutic specificity guide biomedical reasoning. To that
end, I drew on the work of historians of medicine who
have suggested that ideas of tailored treatments for
discrete disorders with specific causes began to permeate
the core of medical reasoning at the turn of the twenti-
eth century. However, to further theorize the role of
such ideas in guiding biomedical reasoning I turned to
the philosophy of science and, more precisely, to Ludwik
Fleck’s ideas about styles of thought. Based on Fleck’s
distinction between passive and active linkages within
thought styles, I proposed the specificity triad as a
model of a framework that guides biomedical reasoning.
More precisely, the specificity triad refers to a frame-
work in the style of thought of biomedicine created by
links of various kinds (material, theoretical, and semi-
otic) between therapeutics, disorders, and pathological
mechanisms. It was suggested that this framework pro-
vides a general scaffold for interpreting and manipulat-
ing the outside world as it presents itself in the form of,
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sive linkages, in Fleckian terms, can then reify over time
into active linkages, thereby allowing the style of thought
of biomedicine to evolve.
Fleck clearly believed that thought styles existed “out
there” and that they, as such, conditioned the cognition
of working scientists. Fleck’s position has subsequently
been challenged. For example, Jonathan Harwood has
argued that thought styles are best understood as ana-
lysts’ constructs, and as such they cannot condition any-
body’s thinking except our own [18]. In this view, styles
are said to differ from theories, concepts, or techniques
that are readily recognized by working scientists as a
guide to their everyday work. Some have nevertheless
maintained that the concept of style of thought may still
be of significant heuristic value insofar as it helps sim-
plify the complexity of the body of knowledge under
scrutiny into an amenable format that allows the analyst
to focus on some deeply embedded assumptions that
underpin reasoning [57,58]. The specificity triad should
be understood in this particular fashion, and it is be-
cause of that that I have referred to it as a model. From
this perspective it may be worth reiterating that one of
the merits of this model is how it draws attention to the
various and more or less fragile material, theoretical, and
semiotic links forged by biomedicine between therapeu-
tics, disorders, and pathophysiology. Here I have tried to
demonstrate this using the examples of regenerative
medicine and psychiatry.
Lastly, it is important to emphasize that this model is
by no way presented as a general challenge to the accur-
acy of the content of the biomedical sciences. On the
contrary, I firmly believe that biomedical reasoning and
research emerged and endured because of its productiv-
ity – as for example seen in the burgeoning field of re-
generative medicine – and because it more often than
not structures the world in a reliable and predictive way.
However, biomedicine has not always succeeded in ful-
filling its aspirations, as the case of psychiatry unmistak-
ably shows. The reason and possible solution for this is
still a matter of intense debate among psychiatrists, phi-
losophers, historians, neuroscientists, and others. Thus
one widely debated proposition for improving the valid-
ity of psychiatric diagnosis advanced by social scientists
is to explicitly incorporate social values alongside scien-
tific components in the concept of disorder [59]. An-
other proposition, but from the natural sciences, is to
replace the existing framework with a framework likely
more relevant to the nature of psychiatric disorders (and
many other disorders) based on the existence of diverse
but connected causal processes at multiple levels (e.g.
molecular, physiological, psychological, social) that link
disorders, mechanisms, and therapeutics [60]. Yet, argu-
ably, it is to a large extent this incongruence betweenthe style of thought of biomedicine and the reality of
psychiatric research, as addressed here, that makes
psychiatry more vulnerable to social and biological criti-
cism than other medical specialties. Thus as Charles
Rosenberg has argued, in today’s biomedicine, diseases
that fail to be associated with a specific cure or with a
specific pathological mechanism that can be approached
with seemingly objective laboratory methods or imaging
techniques, run the risk of being degraded to a lesser
epistemological status [14].
Endnotes
aFor contrasting views on the value of Fleck’s biomed-
ical scholarship and ethical conduct, and of its relation
to his epistemology, see [61-64].
bThis reading eschews more radical constructivist
claims occasionally made by Fleck. But those claims are
incongruent with some weaker versions of constructiv-
ism that Fleck advances elsewhere in his texts, and even
more so with his own scientific practice, especially his
later work [18]. One possible interpretation is that the
inconsistencies in Fleck’s writings reflect an unresolved
tension between Fleck the philosopher that stresses
relativism and idealism and Fleck the scientist that
stresses realism and materialism.
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